Download SealedBrief 1.1.0

SealedBrief ships as a single file per platform that bundles the full AI models — so it's a large download, and then runs with zero network egress. Every download is bound to an Ed25519-signed manifest — see verifying integrity below.

  • Recommended for your Linux machine

    Linux

    x86-64 · portable AppImage · every distribution

    Download SealedBrief for Linux (.AppImage) 15.5 GB

    One portable file — Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, Arch, NixOS. No install step, and no .deb (the bundled AI models exceed the Debian package limit).

    Verify (optional): echo "31d8f05d6d6a2a0198e17cb195b52906d7d38e6aa7c7ee3c2e2f938695ae5877 SealedBrief-1.1.0-x86_64.AppImage" | sha256sum -c

    SHA-256: 31d8f05d6d6a2a0198e17cb195b52906d7d38e6aa7c7ee3c2e2f938695ae5877

    Install & run on Linux
    # 1. make it executable
    chmod +x SealedBrief-1.1.0-x86_64.AppImage
    
    # 2. run it (Debian 12, Ubuntu 20.04 and similar ship libfuse2):
    ./SealedBrief-1.1.0-x86_64.AppImage
    
    # No libfuse2 (Ubuntu 22.04+, Fedora, Arch, NixOS)? Run without FUSE —
    # universal, no install, no sudo, works on every distro:
    ./SealedBrief-1.1.0-x86_64.AppImage --appimage-extract-and-run
    
    # ...or, on Debian/Ubuntu only, install FUSE and run it normally:
    sudo apt install libfuse2
  • Recommended for your macOS machine

    macOS

    Apple Silicon (M1–M4) · signed & notarized

    Download SealedBrief for macOS (.dmg) 15.9 GB

    ✓ Signed with an Apple Developer ID and notarized by Apple. macOS asks once to confirm an app downloaded from the internet — click Open. You will NOT hit an "unidentified developer" block or need a right-click workaround.

    Apple Silicon (M1–M4) only — Intel Macs are not supported.

    Verify (optional): echo "9c7e1b9df9861d6ca3dfd6397b6394fc9ff90dddb9657993edc94f78bfbc798f SealedBrief-1.1.0.dmg" | shasum -a 256 -c

    SHA-256: 9c7e1b9df9861d6ca3dfd6397b6394fc9ff90dddb9657993edc94f78bfbc798f

    Install & run on macOS
    1. Double-click SealedBrief-1.1.0.dmg.
    2. Drag SealedBrief into your Applications folder.
    3. Open Applications and double-click SealedBrief. At the one-time macOS
       prompt ("downloaded from the Internet"), click Open.

Why so large? The AI models (the LLM + the retrieval + reranking models) are inside the download — nothing is fetched at runtime. That's what makes SealedBrief work fully offline, with your documents never leaving the machine.

Ready to buy? Compare the two tiers on the pricing page — Personal $199, Professional $499, both a 3-year term. A licence unlocks this same install instantly, with no reinstall and no lost work, and every purchase is backed by a 30-day, no-questions refund — separate from the free trial above.

Verifying integrity (optional, recommended)

The release ships an Ed25519-signed manifest covering the binary's SHA-256 hash. The same public key SealedBrief uses to verify your purchased licence offline is the one that signs this manifest. So a tampered binary anywhere along the download path (CDN-cache poisoning, malicious mirror, mid-flight injection) gets caught by the same cryptographic chain that secures your licence.

Manifest URL: https://downloads.sealedbrief.com/releases/1.1.0/release_manifest.json

The verification script below downloads the manifest and the SealedBrief public key, then Ed25519-verifies the signature over the canonical manifest bytes. Then compute the binary's SHA-256 and match it against the manifest entry. If either check fails, the binary is suspect — don't run it; email support@sealedbrief.com.

One-liner (requires Python 3 + cryptography)
python3 -c '
import base64, json, urllib.request
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization

# Fetch the manifest + the bundled public key.
manifest_url = "https://downloads.sealedbrief.com/releases/1.1.0/release_manifest.json"
pubkey_url   = "https://sealedbrief.com/release_pubkey.pem"   # mirror of the in-binary pubkey

manifest = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(manifest_url).read())
pubkey   = serialization.load_pem_public_key(urllib.request.urlopen(pubkey_url).read())

# Strip the signature + base_url before computing canonical bytes
# (publish.py adds both fields AFTER signing).
sig = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(manifest.pop("signature") + "==")
manifest.pop("base_url", None)
canonical = json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True).encode("utf-8")

pubkey.verify(sig, canonical)
ver = manifest["version"]
print(f"Manifest signature verified — version {ver}.")
print("Now: compute the SHA-256 of your download (sha256sum on Linux, shasum -a 256 on macOS) and match it against the manifest entry.")
'

That check verifies the binary is the one we published. To audit the running app — confirm the document engine has no network egress and that your vault is encrypted at rest — follow the reproducible procedures on the verify-it-yourself page.